Utah v. Strieff and the Future of the Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule by Gong, Zack
WONG FINAL READ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)  5/13/16 9:06 AM 
UTAH V. STRIEFF AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
ZACK GONG* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people’s 
rights against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 To enforce this 
protection, the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, which 
precludes from trials evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.2 However, the Court has recognized that the exclusionary rule 
takes a heavy toll on the judicial system and society, including potentially 
“setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.”3 To alleviate such social 
cost, the Court has created a series of exceptions to this rule to save certain 
evidence from exclusion, in spite of the illegality in obtaining the 
evidence.4 
In the recent case State v. Strieff, the Supreme Court of Utah held that 
police’s discovery of a lawful outstanding warrant during an unlawful 
investigatory stop cannot save the evidence obtained during that arrest from 
suppression under the attenuation doctrine.5 To reach that decision, the 
court reasoned that the inevitable discovery doctrine, instead of the 
attenuation doctrine, is appropriate for this situation.6 However, the court 
failed to address whether the inevitable discovery doctrine can ultimately 
save the evidence from suppression.7 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
3. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
907 (1984)). 
4. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
443 (1984). 
5. See State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 546 (Utah 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015). 
6. Id.
7. Id.
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The theoretical foundation of how the Fourth Amendment guaranty 
gives rise to the exclusionary rule has never been steadfast; in fact, it is 
subject to constant academic debate.8 Some scholars have even predicted 
the abolishment of the exclusionary rule, in light of the recent 
developments and expansions of the exception doctrines.9 This commentary 
will argue that, given the Court’s policy justification for the exclusionary 
rule10 and the recent trend towards curbing its scope,11 the Court will likely 
reverse the Supreme Court of Utah’s decision and further narrow the 
application of the exclusionary rule. In Part I, this commentary lays out the 
facts of this case; in Part II, it discusses the legal background of the 
exclusionary rule leading up to this case; in Part III, it examines the 
Supreme Court of Utah’s holding and the reasoning behind it; and in Part 
IV, it provides an analysis on how the Supreme Court will rule in this case. 
I.  FACTS 
In December 2006, Officer Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous 
drug tip reporting “narcotics activity” at a South Salt Lake City residence.12 
Subsequently, Officer Fackrell initiated intermittent surveillance over the 
residence totaling three hours over the course of a week, during which he 
observed “short term traffic” at the residence, with visitors arriving and 
leaving within a few minutes.13 The traffic was not very frequent but was 
more than that of a typical household and enough to raise the officer’s 
suspicion of ongoing drug sales activity.14 
During the surveillance, Officer Fackrell saw defendant Edward Strieff 
leaving the residence and walking towards a convenience store.15 Although 
he did not see Strieff entering the residence, Officer Fackrell decided to 
 
 8.  See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476, 478 (2011); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757 (1994); Rhett DeHart, Is the Exclusionary Rule Doomed?, 26-Mar. S.C. LAW. 40 (2015); 
William C. Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1193 (1989). 
 9.  See Matthew Allan Josephson, To Exclude or Not to Exclude: The Future of the Exclusionary 
Rule After Herring v. United States, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 175, 176 (2009) (citing No More Chipping 
Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. 
L.J. 1183 (2012)); DeHart, supra note 8; Candace C. Kilpinen, Herring v. United States: A Threat to 
Fourth Amendment Rights?, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 747 (2010). 
 10.  See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (“The rule’s sole purpose, we have 
repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”). 
 11.  See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 
(1975); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
 12.  Strieff, 357 P.3d at 536. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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“ask someone [to] find out what was going on [in] the house.”16 He 
confronted Strieff and ordered him to stop in a parking lot near the 
convenience store.17 After identifying himself and checking Strieff’s 
identification, Officer Fackrell asked dispatch to run a warrant check on 
Strieff, which revealed an outstanding traffic warrant.18 Pursuant to that 
warrant, Officer Fackrell arrested Strieff, searched him and found a bag of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in his pockets.19 
Strieff was later charged with unlawful possession of 
methamphetamine and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.20 In 
moving to suppress the evidence, Strieff argued that the evidence was 
uncovered during the initial investigatory stop, which was unlawful 
because the official lacked reasonable articulable suspicion—Officer 
Fackrell did not see Strieff entering the house, and thus did not know how 
long he stayed there or anything other than the fact that he left the house at 
one point.21 The state conceded the unlawfulness of the stop, but argued 
that the evidence should nevertheless be admitted pursuant to the 
attenuation exception.22 
The district court denied Strieff’s motion, reasoning that: (1) the 
surveillance had created reasonable suspicion for drug activity, so the stop 
“was to investigate a suspected drug house;” (2) the police officer’s 
conduct was not a flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment but a good 
faith mistake; and (3) weighing all evidence together, suppression of the 
evidence would be an “inappropriate remedy.”23 The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision on the ground that the discovery of a 
valid warrant is a powerful intervening circumstance that would dissipate 
the taint of the unlawful stop, and that the violation by the police officer 
was not flagrant or purposeful.24 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See id. 
 22.  Id. at 536–37. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See State v. Strieff, 286 P.3d 317, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). 
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”25 In simple 
terms, the exclusionary rule dictates that evidence obtained in violation of 
the Constitution is inadmissible in court. However, instead of being a 
constitutional mandate or personal right, the exclusionary rule is a 
judicially-created remedy to enforce the Fourth Amendment.26 In 1914, the 
Court held in Weeks v. United States that the exclusionary rule is 
enforceable in all federal courts.27 In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court held that this 
rule is enforceable against the States through incorporation of the Fourth 
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment.28 
The early cases on the exclusionary rule did not lay out its theoretical 
basis,29 and the rule has since been shrouded by debate and criticism. Some 
scholars have even gone as far as calling its jurisprudence a total mess.30 
The justifications provided by the Court for the rule have changed over the 
years.31 Initially, the Court justified the rule in two ways: first, to 
“discourag[e] police misconduct” and second, as “the imperative of judicial 
integrity.”32 But in the following decades, through multiple landmark cases, 
the Court has clarified that the sole justification for the exclusionary rule 
today is to deter law enforcement officers from engaging in potentially 
unconstitutional conduct. 
Recognizing the undesirable effects of the exclusionary rule, the Court 
developed a series of exceptions when the deterrent value of the rule cannot 
be realized: (1) the independent source exception, (2) the inevitable 
discovery exception, and (3) the attenuation exception.33 
The first two exceptions are closely related, and they utilize a cause-in-
 
 25.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 26.  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
10 (1995) (noting that the Constitution “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of its commands”). 
 27.  See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 28.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). 
 29.  Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and 
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1983) 
(“Unfortunately, the early cases fail to provide insight and guidance into the constitutional 
underpinnings for the exclusionary rule.”). 
 30.  See Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 821, 821 (2013) (“Academics and jurists of all stripes agree that the Court’s case law in this area 
is a mess.”); Amar, supra note 8, at 757, 759; Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the 
Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973). 
 31.  Josephson, supra note 9, at 179. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See generally Brent D. Stratton, The Attenuation Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Study 
in Attenuated Principal and Dissipated Logic, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1984). 
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fact analysis.34 Under the independent source doctrine, the taint on evidence 
that resulted from police misconduct will be dissipated if that same 
evidence is also obtained through another lawful method.35 Under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, the tainted evidence will be admitted in court 
if it “ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means 
even if no violation of any constitutional provision had taken place.”36 In 
these two scenarios, evidence has been or would have been discovered by 
separate lawful means, so the deterrent value of the rule is insufficient to 
justify its application. 
The third exception, the attenuation doctrine, shifts from a cause-in-fact 
analysis to a proximate cause analysis.37 It permits the admission of 
evidence discovered through police misconduct if the legal nexus between 
the misconduct and the evidence is sufficiently attenuated.38 The logic of 
this doctrine was first elaborated and clarified in Wong Sun v. United 
States.39  In Wong Sun, the Court held that a defendant’s confession, made 
several days after the police’s unlawful invasion of his residence, was 
admissible because the connection between the misconduct and the 
confession had become sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint.40 The 
Court identified two key elements: first, the government did not exploit the 
police wrongdoing to obtain the evidence, and second, the confession 
worked as an intervening circumstance of free will.41 
Later in Brown v. Illinois,42 the Court developed a three-factor test to 
determine whether the attenuation doctrine is applicable: (1) the “temporal 
proximity” between the unlawful police conduct and the discovery of the 
evidence in question, (2) the existence of “intervening circumstances,” and 
(3) the “purpose and flagrancy” of the official’s misconduct.43 A closer 
temporal proximity may indicate a bigger effect of the unlawful conduct on 
the collection of evidence and the potential exploitation of the conduct by 
the police, thus working in favor of suppression.44 An intervening 
circumstance is deemed to exist if it is “so distinct from the threshold 
Fourth Amendment violation that it can be said that the challenged 
 
 34.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 539 (Utah 2015). 
 35.  Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988). 
 36.  Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432 (1984). 
 37.  Strieff, 357 P.3d at 540. 
 38.  See Stratton, supra note 33, at 140–41. 
 39.  371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 40.  Id. at 491. 
 41.  See Stratton, supra note 33, at 146. 
 42.  422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
 43.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 541 (Utah 2015) (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04). 
 44.  Id. 
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evidence is not a product of ‘exploitation’ of the illegality but instead the 
result of ‘means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.’”45 And lastly, a purposeful and flagrant conduct is something 
“obviously improper” and “investigatory in design and purpose and 
executed in the hope that something might turn up.”46 
III.  HOLDING 
The issue in Utah v. Strieff is whether to apply the attenuation doctrine 
to the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant and thereby exempt the 
evidence obtained from the lawful arrest from suppression.47 According to 
the Supreme Court of Utah, all the attenuation-doctrine cases so far have 
involved voluntary confessions and the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
specifically decided the issue of this case.48 
The Supreme Court of Utah delineated three general lines of reasoning 
adopted by lower courts on this issue.49 The first group of cases, 
exemplified by United States v. Green, holds that the discovery of a 
preexisting warrant is an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the 
taint of the prior unlawful police conduct, provided that the unlawful 
conduct itself is not flagrant.50 In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh 
Circuit focused on the question of whether the deterrent function of the 
exclusionary rule can be served because “application of the rule does not 
serve this deterrent function when the police action, although erroneous, 
was not undertaken in an effort to benefit the police at the expense of the 
suspect’s protected rights.”51 The court also cited Wong Sun v. United 
States, claiming that the evidence obtained from a lawful arrest pursuant to 
a preexisting warrant comes not “by exploitation of that illegality [but] by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”52 In 
addition to the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit and eleven state high 
courts have also adopted this rationale.53 
The second group of cases applied the Brown v. Illinois test, but 
concluded that in the situation of a preexisting arrest warrant,  attenuation 
 
 45.  Id. (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). 
 46.  Id. (citing United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 47.  Id. at 535. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 51.  Id. (citing United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 958 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373 (U.S. May 15, 2015). 
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doctrine does not apply.54 In State v. Moralez,55 the court concluded that: (1) 
applying the first factor, the short time between the unlawful detention and 
the discovery of the warrant leads to a high temporal proximity, which 
“weighs heavily” against the application, and (2) applying the third factor, 
the unlawful detention followed by a warrant search demonstrated some 
resemblance to an “investigatory detention designed and executed in the 
hope that something might turn up” and thus exhibited “at least some level 
of flagrant conduct.”56 
The third line of reasoning, the one the Supreme Court of Utah adopted 
in this case, is to deem the attenuation doctrine inapplicable in the situation 
of a preexisting warrant.57 This rationale originated from the dissenting 
opinion in State v. Frierson,58 in which Chief Justice Pariente proposed to 
limit the application of the attenuation doctrine to its original basis—
situations involving a voluntary confession as a result of the independent 
acts of free will of the defendant, and thus excluding the preexisting 
warrant from consideration.59 
The Supreme Court of Utah believed that the U.S. Supreme Court, 
through several seminal cases on the attenuation doctrine—Brown, Wong 
Sun, Kaupp—indicated that the application of this doctrine is restricted to 
cases where the intervening cause is a voluntary confession of the 
defendant that breaks the legal proximate causation between the discovery 
of evidence and the initial police misconduct.60 
The court provided two reasons to back up this claim: (1) the Brown 
factor test works to exclude a preexisting warrant situation from 
application—both the “temporal proximity” and the “purpose and 
flagrancy” factors focus on a proximate causation inquiry, and a warrant 
check is hardly an unforeseeable or superseding event after an unlawful 
detention; (2) the scenario of this case fits better with the doctrine of 
inevitable discovery, which covers evidence that will inevitably be 
discovered by a line of lawful police work separated from the unlawful 
detention—in this case, the execution of the legitimate warrant.61 The court 
 
 54.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 543 (Utah 2015; see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 
(1975). 
 55.  300 P.3d 1090 (Kan. 2013). 
 56.  Strieff, 357 P.3d at 543 (citing Moralez, 300 P.3d at 1103). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  926 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 2006). 
 59.  Strieff, 357 P.3d at 543 (citing Frierson, 926 So.2d at 1149–50 (Pariente, C.J., dissenting)). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015) (“[W]e deem the inevitable discovery doctrine 
to control.”). 
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believed extending the coverage of the attenuation doctrine here would 
“eviscerate the inevitable discovery exception.”62 Thus, the Supreme Court 
of Utah reversed the lower court decision regarding the invocation of this 
doctrine.63 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Through a series of recent holdings, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the exclusionary rule has been shifting towards limiting 
the rule’s scope and power. Both Strieff and Utah have cited these seminal 
Supreme Court cases and considered the arguments in those cases in 
forming their own arguments.64 
In Hudson v. Michigan, the Detroit police force violated the knock-and-
announce rule because after announcing their presence, they waited only 
“three to five seconds” before breaking in Hudson’s house to execute a 
legitimate search warrant on narcotics and weapons.65 Facing the issue of 
whether a violation of the knock-and-announce rule would result in the 
suppression of all the evidence obtained in the search, the Court, by a vote 
of 5-4, held that the exclusionary rule is not a proper remedy for a violation 
of the knock-and-announce rule.66 
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia stressed that the suppression of 
evidence “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse,” and that it 
shall only apply when its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social 
cost, including setting dangerous criminals free.67 Because “the value of 
deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the 
forbidden act” and violating the knock-and-announce rule provides the 
police with little expected value and thus little incentive to commit the 
violation, the deterrence value here is too little to justify the suppression of 
evidence.68 
In Herring v. New York, a police officer arrested Herring based on a 
warrant in the neighboring county’s database, and a search incident to 
arrest revealed methamphetamine and an illegal pistol.69 However, 
 
 62.  Id. at 545. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See generally Brief for Petitioner, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2015); 
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373 (U.S. June 30, 2015). 
 65.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 586–88 (2006). 
 66.  Id. at 586. 
 67.  Id. at 591. 
 68.  Id. at 596. 
 69.  Herring v. New York, 555 U.S. 135, 138 (2009). 
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unbeknownst to the officer, the warrant had been recalled months earlier 
and the recall was not entered into the system due to a police mistake.70 
The U.S. Supreme Court, by another 5-4 vote, ruled against the 
suppression of the evidence, reasoning that the police officer’s conduct in 
that case was not “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully 
deter it [or] sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price 
paid by the justice system.”71 The Court laid out the exclusionary rule as a 
remedy reserved for “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or 
in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,” and concluded 
that a suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for the simple 
negligence mistake.72 
The Herring rationale was further confirmed by another case, Davis v. 
United States.73 In Davis, the police arrested Willie Davis during a routine 
vehicle stop for giving a false name, and in the search of Davis’s car 
incident to arrest, the police found an illegal weapon.74 The police search of 
the vehicle complied with relevant appellate precedent at the time, but as 
Davis appealed his case to a federal court of appeals, the U.S. Supreme 
Court announced a new rule governing searches of vehicles incident to 
arrests of recent occupants,75 which made the police search of Davis’s car 
illegal.76 
Because the police officer in Davis was neither negligent nor culpable 
and thus suppressing the evidence had no meaningful effect, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, by a vote of 7-2, held that the exclusionary rule was not 
applicable.77 The Court continued to stress how rare the exclusionary rule 
should be applied and how a good faith or simple and isolated mistake of 
the police should not result in suppression of the evidence found.78 
Applying the rationale of the above cases to Utah v. Strieff, the answer 
seems readily evident. The mistake made in this case was non-systemic and 
non-recurring. Prior to the stoppage, the officer had the house under 
surveillance for a week and observed sufficient short-term traffic to believe 
that he had enough evidence to establish reasonable suspicion about 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 144. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 76.  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
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potential drug activities.79 Although this belief was later held to be 
incorrect, the officer was merely one fact short from having a sufficient 
legal basis to stop Strieff: he did not see Strieff entering the residence under 
surveillance.80 As the district court held, such a misjudgment with minimal 
culpability by the officer is a “good faith mistake on the part of the officer 
as to the quantum of evidence needed to justify an investigatory 
detention,”81 and by any standard, the Court should not characterize such an 
action as “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.”82 Thus, the 
exclusionary rule should not be the proper remedy. 
Moreover, the above line of cases limiting the application of the 
exclusionary rule triggered discussion about the future of the rule and its 
possible abolishment,83 especially when the very justification of the 
exclusionary rule—its deterrent effect on police misconduct—can hardly be 
empirically proven and is hotly debated. In fact, some studies show that the 
imposition of such rules actually increased crime rates.84 Because of the 
questionable efficacy of the current ex post remedies, scholars have started 
to shift their attention to the alternative ex ante prevention of Fourth 
Amendment violations.85 Overall, it seems that the reasons for which the 
exclusionary rule was originally created have already expired—the U.S. 
police force today has taken people’s constitutional rights more seriously 
and generally obeys the Fourth Amendment requirement,86 and the 
ubiquitous coverage of mass media has also served to deter police 
misconduct. Thus, it is likely that the Court will continue to limit the 
application of the exclusionary rule by reversing the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its creation, the exclusionary rule, an ex post remedy deterring 
 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536–37 (Utah 2015). 
 81.  Id. at 535. 
 82.  Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 83.  See generally Dehart, supra note 9. 
 84.  See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1365, 1383 (2008) (“[T]he imposition of the exclusionary rule increased violent crimes by 27 
percent and property crimes by 20 percent.”). 
 85.  See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1609 (2012) (arguing that a serious ex ante warrant requirement will be much clearer and more 
effective than a deterrence model). But see David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can 
Reinforce—or Replace—the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149 (2009) 
(arguing that criminology studies have shown that the exclusionary rule still possesses its unique 
deterrence value). 
 86.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006). 
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police violation of the Fourth Amendment, has been subject to controversy 
due to its uncertain legal foundation and questionable effectiveness. In the 
past decade the Supreme Court has navigated the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence towards a much more limited application of the exclusionary 
rule, applying it only to those cases where the police misconduct was 
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent. Thus, applying this rationale to 
the facts in Utah v. Strieff, the Supreme Court is should consider Officer 
Fackrell’s misconduct to be a good-faith misjudgment, and decide that the 
exclusionary rule is not a proper remedy for it. 
 
